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Hans-Theo Normann* 
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Two timing games which endogenize the order of moves in duopoly 
are applied for a quantity setting model with incomplete information. 
The first timing game is such that firms have commit to a quantity in 
one out of two periods. This timing game exhibits multiple equilibria. 
This is in contrast to previous results in the literature which establish 
a unique timing equilibrium under restricted assumptions. The sec­
ond timing game is such that firms announce their timing decision in 
advance without committing to an action. This timing game reduces 
the number of equilibria and supports a Cournot equilibrium for a 
wide range of parameters.
*1 am grateful to Stephen Martin, Meg Meyer. Louis Phlips and participants of seminars 
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In many situations, it seems perfectly reasonable that firms have some leeway 
in timing their business decisions and will use this leeway strategically. In the­
oretical oligopoly analysis the simplest way of reflecting this is to model firms 
as moving simultaneously or sequentially. Models of simultaneous choice in­
clude the Cournot and the Bertrand model; Stackelberg and price leader 
models are based on sequential moves of the firms. Usually the order of 
moves in oligopoly models is assumed to be exogenous, but there is a growing 
literature1 which establishes conditions and criteria under which firms agree 
endogenously whether to play a simultaneous or a sequential move game. 
The results of such models of endogenous timing are the benchmark for the 
robustness of results obtained from models in which firms are restricted to a 
certain timing structure.
Particularly interesting is the problem of endogenous timing in the con­
text of uncertainty2. Under perfect information, and with downward sloping 
reaction functions, there is an incentive for moving first. The Stackelberg 
leader earns a higher profit than the Stackelberg follower. Also the profit in 
a simultaneous move Cournot, equilibrium is strictly preferred to the profit of 
a Stackelberg follower. However, in a game with incomplete information, the 
preferences for moving first and second might be changed. Gal-Or (1987), in
1 See Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) and Van Damme and Hurkens (1993, 1995) for a 
general analysis of games with perfect information.




























































































a quantity setting model with a privately informed Stackelberg leader and an 
uninformed follower, showed that the leader might earn lower expected profits 
than in a Cournot model with complete information. Due to the distortion in 
the equilibrium action of the privately informed player which typically arises 
in signalling games, it is possible that moving first is a disadvantage.
Mailath (1993) analyses a model of endogenous timing allowing for such 
a first-mover disadvantage. A firm with superior information can choose be­
tween either moving first and acting as a Stackelberg leader, or moving second 
and playing a simultaneous Cournot game with the uninformed firm. The 
uninformed firm is restricted to moving second. Intuitively, the choice of 
the informed firm should depend on whether the first mover disadvantage 
exists or not, but Mailath shows that this intuition will not hold. Even when 
moving first is disadvantageous for the informed firm, playing the simulta­
neous Cournot game is not an equilibrium. The informed firm moves first, 
regardless of its private information.
From an empirical point of view Mailath's restriction, that only the 
informed firm is allowed to move first, might be justifiable. Mailath gives 
an example of a scenario in which this possibility is important. A patent 
holding firm must choose a new capacity at the end of the life of the patent. 
If the capacity is chosen just before the expiration of the patent, then the 
incumbent is able to act like a Stackelberg leader; if the incumbent waits, 
then it moves simultaneously with the uninformed firm. In such a scenario 




























































































incumbent firm are plausible. There are. however, equally plausible situations 
in which both firms have the possibility of moving first or second. Consider, 
for example, entry into a new market. Due to a deregulation, it is known 
that the new market will exist in a certain amount of time. Because of its 
experience, a firm which operates in a related line of business has some idea of 
what the demand in the market will be. In contrast to this, a new firm which 
starts the business from the beginning will be uncertain about demand. In a 
scenario of this kind the asymmetric information is justified, but both firms 
have leeway in their timing decision.
From a theoretical point of view, the question is whether or not Mailath’s 
result is robust to a relaxation of the restriction on the uninformed firm’s 
timing choice. This is the first problem addressed in this paper. Mailath’s 
model is extended for the case in which both firms are allowed to produce 
their quantity first or second. At the end of his paper, Mailath claims that 
in this case the only change is to introduce one more equilibrium: in this 
equilibrium the uninformed firm plays Stackelberg leader and the informed 
firm follower. If this were true, the model would still have some predictive 
power, because simultaneous Cournot equilibria could be ruled out. How­
ever, this claim is wrong. There are further equilibria with the uninformed 
firm moving first, and some types of the informed firm playing Cournot and 
others Stackelberg follower.
The multitude of equilibria calls for the application of equilibrium re­




























































































equilibria. Therefore, he requires the sequential equilibria to pass the equi­
librium refinement D 1 (Cho and Kreps (1987)). Imposing this refinement 
indeed reduces the set of sequential equilibria drastically. This explains how 
Mailath establishes his strong result. In the cases discussed in this paper, 
D 1 has no power. The equilibria of the extended game derived in this paper 
do survive D 1 because the-uninformed firm moves simultaneously with, or 
before, the informed firm. In a similar context, Daughety and Reinganum 
(1994) suggest trembling hand perfectness (Selten (1975)) as an additional 
equilibrium refinement. While Daughety and Reinganum apply the criterion 
successfully, it turns out that trembling hand perfectness does not reduce 
the number of equilibria in this model. The timing equilibria are robust to 
trembles in firms’ timing decisions.
The second novelty of this paper is to analyse a different timing game. 
In Mailath (1993) firms can make their timing decision only by committing to 
a quantity. When moving first, they have to make their choice without know­
ing what the rival firm is doing. This timing game is also applied, e.g. by 
Albaek (1992), Van Damme and Hurkens (1993, 1995) and Daughety and 
Reinganum (1994). In the alternative timing game, firms announce their 
timing decision in a pre-production stage without specifying the quantity. 
Firms are committed to this timing decision and produce in the sequence 
which resulted from the announcements. Applications of this game can be 
found, e.g. in Albaek (1990) and Spencer and Brander (1992). Hamilton and 
Slutsky (1990) call the first game “the extended game with action commit­




























































































terminology is used in this paper.
The extended game with observable delay has not been applied yet 
in a context of incomplete information. For the present model, it turns 
out that timing results differ significantly to those of the extended game 
with action commitment. For a wide range of parameters the timing game 
with observable delay supports a simultaneous Cournot equilibrium involving 
all types of the informed firm. This outcome cannot be sustained as an 
equilibrium in the timing game with action commitment.
In the next section the general model is outlined. In Section 3. endoge­
nous timing with action commitment is analysed: Mailath's (1993) analysis 
is extended for the case that also the uninformed firm has the flexibility to 
move first or second. Trembling hand perfectness of the timing equilibria is 
examined in Section 4. In Section 5, the results for the extended game with 
observable delay are given. Section 6 is the conclusion.
2 The M odel
There are two quantity setting firms, with qi and q2 denoting firms’ quanti­
ties. The inverse demand function is assumed to be linear:
p = a - q { -  q2. (1)
The demand intercept, a, might take three different values: o \ om and ah, 
where




























































































(note that in a model with only two types, the first mover disadvantage does 
not occur; see the Appendix). The restriction a1 > ah/2 is to ensure (without 
loss of generality) that the equilibrium quantities derived below are positive. 
Let firm 1 be the firm which is informed about the state of demand. The 
uninformed firm, firm 2. has prior beliefs on the states of demand
p r o b . ( a  =  a ) =  P , ( 3 )
p r o b . ( a  =  a™) =  p m i ( 4 )
p r o b . ( a  =  a " ) =  p " . ( 3 )
which are common knowledge. Firms produce at equal constant marginal 
cost. Price is measured net of marginal cost, so notation for cost is not 
needed. There is no entry or exit.
Firms must decide when to produce their output. Their choice is re­
stricted to one out of two possible periods, t £ {1,2}. The way in which 
firms choose their production period is given by two extended timing games: 
the extended game with action commitment and the extended game with 
observable delay. The analysis in Section 3 applies the extended game with 
action commitment: a firm can move first only by committing to an output. 
When doing so, the firm does not know what its rival is doing. When waiting, 
i.e. producing in period 2, a firm can observe the other firm’s period 1 action, 
which is either a quantity or also the decision to wait. The equilibrium out­
comes are obtained by checking each potential equilibrium separately: does 





























































































In the extended game with observable delay (which is applied in Section 
5), firms first announce at which periods they will produce their output. 
At this stage, firms need not yet specify the quantity, however, firms are 
committed to the timing decision. Both firms know the timing choice of the 
rival firm when producing the output. Production is in the sequence which 
results from the timing announcements. Subgame perfection implies that for 
each timing order there is only one possible outcome. If one firm announces 
t =  1 production, while the second chooses 1 — 2. a Stackelberg equilibrium 
results. If both firms announce the same period, a Cournot game is played. 
For equilibrium analysis of the extended game with observable delay the 
profits for all possible timing decisions have to be derived, and then the 
timing outcome is obtained by comparing across profits of the Cournot and 
Stackelberg equilibria.
The equilibrium concept for these games with incomplete information 
is that of sequential equilibrium as introduced by Kreps and Wilson (1982). 
A sequential equilibrium requires the specification of strategies and beliefs 
in and off the equilibrium path. The system of beliefs has to be consistent 




























































































3 Endogenous T im ing w ith A ction C om m it­
m ent
Maintaining the restriction that the uninformed moves second. Mailath proves 
the following theorem.
Theorem 1. (Mailath (1993)). The only equilibrium, outcomes that satisfy 
D1 are the separating Stackelberg outcome and the revealing equilibria (when 
they exist) in which either a™ produces q\" — «"'/3 in period 2 or aproduces 
q™ =  am/3 in period 2.
The equilibria not eliminated by D 1 (Cho and Kreps (1987)) all yield the 
quantities of the separating Stackelberg equilibrium. The revealing equilibria 
of Theorem 1 involve period 2 production by one type of firm 1, so that the 
lack of production at t = 1 reveals the type to firm 2. The level of production 
in these equilibria is the level from the separating equilibrium. Generically 
(see the Corollary in Mailath (1993)) the separating Stackelberg outcome is 
the only timing equilibrium satisfying D 1.
In this section, the constraint on firm 2’s choice is relaxed. To begin 
with, note that giving also firm 2 the possibility of moving first, does not 
have any impact on the existence of the equilibria in Theorem 1. Fix firm 
l ’s behaviour. Firm 2’s reaction at t =  2 is optimal, so it cannot be profit 
increasing to move first. But, when switching to t = 1, it loses the informa­




























































































by deviating from period 2 production and does not deviate from any of the 
equilibria in Theorem 1.
When firm 2 has timing flexibility, there are four additional potential 
types of equilibria:
I. the non-signalling Stackelberg equilibrium, with firm 2 as the Stackel- 
berg leader and all types of firm 1 as followers,
II. the Cournot equilibrium, with firm 2 and all types of firm 1 moving at 
t = 1.
III. equilibria with firm 2 moving at t = 1. one type of firm 1 playing 
Cournot at t = 1 and the other two types playing Stackelberg follower 
at t =  2,
IV. equilibria with firm 2 moving at t = 1. two types of firm 1 playing 
Cournot at t =  1 and the other type playing Stackelberg follower at 
t = 2.
In all these cases, firm 2 moves before or simultaneously with firm 1. Thus, 
if equilibria of type I-IV exist, they will depend on firm 2’s priors only.
At the end of his paper. Mailath makes the following claim: “Finally, 
observe that if both firms have the option of choosing in either period 1 or 
2, then the only change is to introduce one additional equilibrium. In this 
equilibrium, firm 2 chooses in period 1 and firm 1 chooses in period 2. ” This 




























































































Ill and IV also exist. Consider all four types of equilibria in turn. Denote 
prior mean beliefs by a — p'a1 4- + ph(ih and let a € {a1. a’".a1'} denote
the true state of demand.
Case I. First consider the case in which the uninformed firm, firm 2, 
acts as the Stackelberg leader. Firm 2 maximizes a Stackelberg leader profit 
of
*2 =  (5 -  9 g2 -  92)92- (6)
Solving for q2 gives r/2 = «/2, and firm l's  optimal response to this is q\ — 
(2a — a)/A. These quantities yield the following profits (all profit expressions 
of firm 2 are expected profits)
Now check whether this timing configuration is consistent with sequen­
tial equilibrium. Given firm 2’s output decision, firm 1 cannot gain by moving 
first. Firm 1 would have to produce the same quantity at. t =  1 which does 
not change its profits. Firm 2 is worse off when defecting to t = 2 pro­
duction. It would lose the first mover advantage and would not improve its 
level of information. Since neither firm has an incentive to deviate, the equi­
librium with firm 2 as the Stackelberg leader is a sequential equilibrium in 
endogenous timing.




























































































1 and firm 2 moving at t = 1. Firm 2 maximizes
tr-2 = (a -  q, -  q2)q2 (9)
with respect to q2. This yields an equilibrium output of q2 =  5/3. Given q2, 
firm 1 of type a produces q\ = (3a — â)/6. Profits in this alleged equilibrium 
are
/ 3a — a\ 2 (10)7r‘ ~ ( 6 ) ’
** "  ( s )  ' (ID
Given firm 2’s action, firm 1 cannot gain by defecting from this equi­
librium. However, firm 2 has an incentive to delay. Fix firm l's quantity 
decision at t =  1. Firm 2. by waiting, can produce according to the realized 
quantity of firm 1, which strictly increases its profits. In addition, firm 2 can 
also infer the state of demand from firm l's action at this stage, because the 
different types of firm 1 produce different quantities. When defecting to t = 2 
production, firm 2’s optimal response to qj = (3a — a)/6 is q2 = (3a + a)/12. 
Thus, by defecting from the equilibrium and waiting, firm 2 gets an expected 
profit of
By Jensen’s inequality, the defection payoff > (a)2/9. with the equal­
ity holding for any p = 1. Hence, firm 2 has an incentive to delay and the 





























































































Case III. In this case, one type of firm 1 plays simultaneously with firm 
2 at t =  1, while the other types produce at t =  2. Denote the type of firm 
1 which moves first by a', and the two types moving second by a" and a1". 
Firm 2 has to maximize the following expression
n2 = p'(o' - q[ - q 2)q2 +p"(ff" -  — ~-<h - q2)q-2+ p"'(a'" -  ° ?  <h - q 2)q2- (13)
In equilibrium, q2 — 5/(2 + p') and cy, — («(2 + p') -  5)/(2(2 + p')). These 
quantities give equilibrium profits of
/ a(2 +  p') -  5 V
V 2(2 + ^ ) j
(«)a(l + //)
2( 2  +  p' ) 2 '
(14)
(15)
Note that if p' = 1 and the state of demand is a = a', one obtains the full 
information Cournot equilibrium profits n2 =  7T', =  (o')2/ 9. If //' =  1 and a = 
a", one gets the Stackelberg equilibrium profits 7t2 = (o")2/8, 7t" = (a")2/ 16. 
Similarly, the Stackelberg equilibrium for o'" is obtained for p'" =  1.
Consider defection from this equilibrium. Given that firm 2 produces 
<72 at t = 1, there is no incentive for firm 1 to deviate. Firm 2, by defecting, 
can observe whether or not type o' moved first, and can appropriately update 
its priors. If there is period 1 production, firm 2 puts all weight on a' in its 
beliefs. Its optimal reaction to is then q2el = (o'(2 + p') + 5)/(4(2 + />')). 
If firm 2 observes no t =  1 production, it puts all weight on p" and p'", such 




























































































types firm 2 now plays Cournot rather than Stackelberg leader. Thus, firm 
2’s expected defection profit is
Tdef _= P
(a')\2  + p')2 - {âŸ
8(2 + p')2 +
(p"a" + p'" a"1)2 
9(p" + p"') (16)
Type III equilibria exist when 7t2 as in (15) is larger than f . Assume firm 
2’s priors are such that there is only a small weight on a', the type moving 
first, i.e. p' is small. Now, as p' -» 0, 7t2 — —> (p"a" + p'"(i'")2/ 72 > 0, and
adhering to the equilibrium is more profitable than defecting from it. Thus 
type III equilibria exist. While p' ss 0 is a sufficient condition, it is far from 
being necessary (see the Appendix). Note also that, for // small, any type 
constellation can be an equilibrium, no matter whether a1, o'" or ah moves 
first. In other words, there are three equilibria of type III.
Case IV. Two types of firm 1 play simultaneously, with firm 2 at t =  1 
and the remaining type produces at t = 2 as a Stackelberg follower. Denote 
the types moving first by a' and a", and the type which moves second by a'". 
Firm 2 maximizes
7T2 — p'(a' — q\ — qv)qi + p"(a" — q" — q-2)q2 + p'"(a'"-------— -  q2)q-2- (17)
One gets equilibrium quantities of <y2 = 5/(3 — p"') for firm 2 and qt = 
(a(3 -  p'") -  a)/(2(3 -  p'")) for firm 1 of type a. These quantities give profits 
of
/  a(3 — p"') — à \ 2 




























































































(«)2( - W " )
2(3 -p " ') 2 ■
(19)n2 =
Given firm 2‘s behaviour, firm 1 cannot gain by deviating from the 
above equilibrium. Firm 2. when defecting, can observe whether or not 
a' or a" moved first. If there is period 1 production, firm 2 can infer the 
state of demand since these types produce different quantities. Then, q2c* = 
(a(3 — p'") + a)/(4(3 — /?'")). If there is no period 1 production, firm 2 knows 
that type o'" produces at t = 2. By defecting, firm 2 loses the possibility to 
commit itself to the Stackelberg leader quantity: with probability p'" it now 
plays Cournot at t =  2 and no longer Stackelberg leader with o'". Thus, firm 
2’s expected profit from defecting is
def   l (a')2(3 ~ p'")1 ~ (o)2 , a (o")2(3 — p"'Y — (fl)
8(3 -  ft-  o '"  V2 8(3 — ft")2 + P
,(om\ 2
( 20 )
Assume that the priors held by firm 2 are such that small weight is on the 
types moving first (o', a"). As ft" —> 1. n2 — tx2 ! —> (o'")2/ 72 > 0, so firm 
2 adheres to the equilibrium and type IV equilibria are shown to exist. The 
sufficient condition, p'" «  1. clearly overstates the necessary conditions for 
the existence of type IV equilibria (see the Appendix). As under III, there 
are three equilibria of type IV: any type of firm 1 can move first or second.
Theorem  2. If both firms have the option of choosing m either period 1 or 
period 2, then equilibria additional to those in Theorem. 1 have firm 2 moving 
at t = 1 and i) all types of firm. 1 playing Stackelberg follower at t = 2, ii) 




























































































t = 2, in) two types of firm. 1 producing at t = 1 and the other type producing 
a tt  = 2.
Since type III and type IV equilibria allow for all combination of types 
of firm 1, there are seven equilibria additional to those in Theorem 1.
4 Trembling Hand Perfectness o f the Sequen­
tial Equilibria
Daughety and Reinganum (1994) suggest trembling hand perfectness (Sel- 
ten (1975)) as an additional equilibrium refinement. Trembling hand perfect 
equilibrium follows a different route than belief-based refinements. Here, 
out-of-equilibrium messages are treated in such a way that each firm takes 
into account that the rival firm might make uncorrelated mistakes which lead 
to this unexpected event. Sequential equilibria are trembling hand perfect 
if they are robust to such small perturbations of the equilibrium strategies. 
Here the robustness of the timing equilibria to small trembles in both firm’s 
timing decisions is checked. Trembles in quantity decisions are not consid­
ered.
Eguilibria of Theorem. 1. It is straightforward to check that the equi­
libria in Theorem 1 are robust to trembles. Take the separating Stackelberg 
equilibrium and assume that firm 2 trembles. With a probability of e, firm 
2 will produce at t = 1 according to its priors. Both firms’ output will vary 




























































































quantities. Then, firm 1 strictly prefers to move first and there is no incentive 
to defect. If firm 1 trembles, it moves second with probability e. Unless c 
is not very big, firm 2 cannot gain defecting to t = 1 production. For the 
revealing equilibria of Theorem 1, the same argument holds because type am 
or a1 produce exactly the separating equilibrium quantity at t = 2. Thus, 
the equilibria in Theorem 1 are trembling hand perfect.
Equilibria of Theorem 2, trembles by firm 1. Next check the equilibria 
of Theorem 2 and consider first trembles by firm 1. If some type of firm 1. 
which moves first, trembles such that it moves second with a small probability 
e, firm 2 does not defect. The opposite is true, the incentives of firm 2 to 
move first are increased because it plays Stackelberg leader with a higher 
probability. If a type which moves second trembles, this changes equilibrium 
outputs in c because, with probability e, firm 2 now plays Cournot rather 
than Stackelberg leader with these types. However, as f. small both firms 
play roughly their equilibrium quantities. So for a small enough e. firm 2 
will adhere to the equilibrium. Thus, trembles by firm 1 do not reduce the 
number of equilibria in Theorem 3.2.
Equilibria of Theorem. 2. trembles by firm 2. case I. Take the Stackel­
berg equilibrium with the uninformed firm as the Stackelberg leader. With 
probability 1 — e, firm 2 produces its equilibrium output q? = 5/2 and, with 
probability e, it trembles. If firm 1 adheres to the equilibrium, it gets the 
equilibrium profit with probability 1 — e. In the event of a tremble, firm 2 is 




























































































1 of type a produces (3a -  a)/G. Hence, if firm 2 trembles, adhering to the 
equilibrium gives firm 1 a profit of
( 2 1 )
Defecting from this equilibrium, firm l's  out-of-equilibrium action is to pro­
duce the equilibrium quantity 91 = (2a — a)/4. but in period 1. With prob­
ability 1 — e nothing changes in comparison to the equilibrium: firm 2 still 
produces the Stackelberg leader quantity at t = 1. so firm 1 gets the same 
profit. But, in the event of a tremble, firm 2 observes firm l's quantity at 
t =  1. Assuming that firm 2 assigns probability 1 that this out-of-equilibrium 
message was sent by type a (which maximizes firm l's incentive to defect), 
it produces q-2 = (2a + a )/8. So firm l's defection payoff is
to the equilibrium is preferred if 144a2 — 192aa + 68a2 > 0. Since 2a < 
a < a /2, this inequality holds and there is no profitable deviation for any 
type of firm 1. Thus, the non-signalling Stackelberg equilibrium is robust to 
trembles in the timing decision.
Case II. The Cournot equilibrium at t — 1, constituted by all types 
of firm 1 and firm 2, is not a sequential equilibrium, so trembling hand 
perfectness does not have to be checked.
(2 2 )




























































































Case III. In a sequential equilibrium of case III. type a' produces first 
and types a" and o'" move second. Firm 2 plays the equilibrium action with 
probability 1 — e, and with e it trembles. Equilibrium quantities will vary in £, 
but since e is small this effect can be ignored. If there is no tremble, types a" 
and a'" receive their equilibrium profits. With probability e. firm 2 observes 
that type a' did not produce at t = 1 and accordingly updates its posteriors. 
Denote firm 2's posterior mean beliefs by a = (p"a" + p"'a"l)/(p" +  p'"). At 
t = 2, firm 2 plays a Cournot quantity of a /3. Thus, by adhering to the 
equilibrium, a" and a'" get a profit of
/ a(2 + p') - « y  / 3c/ -  ù\ 2
V 2(2 +  p') )  A  6 )  '
(23)
To analyse defection by a" or a"', the out-of-equilibrium action to be exam­
ined is the production of ry, =  (o(2 + p') -  ci)/(2(2 + p')) at t =  1. Assuming 
firm 2 correctly identifies that this message was sent by type a (which max­
imizes the incentive to defect), it produces q? = (o(2 +  p') -(- â)/(4(2 -f p')). 
Thus, from defecting, types a" and get a profit of
r* / -=  ( 1 - 0
«(2 +  p') -  à Y  ( a2(2 -F p'Ÿ -  (Ü)2 (24)
2(2 + pf) )  "  8(2+ //)2
Types n" and o'" adhere to the equilibrium if n“dh > ndef. Recall that p1 ~  0 
is a sufficient condition for the existence of type III equilibria. Now, as p' -4 0, 
the term 7r“d/‘ > ndê  simplifies to 144c»2 — 192oô + 68ô2 > 0 as above for 
case I. Since this condition holds, there are type III equilibria which survive 




























































































and some priorsthere might he equilibria which are indeed erased by applying 
tremblinghand perfect equilibrium. To complete the analysis one would have 
to check whether or not o" and o'" have a profitable defection and that a' 
could not profitably play this out of equilibrium action. However, since focus 
is here on the existence of equilibria, it is sufficient to show that, for p' ss 0, 
type III equilibria survive the trembling hand criterion.
Case IV. Finally, consider the equilibria in which only one type of firm 
1, o'", produces at t =  2. Ignoring the impact which firm 2‘s trembles have 
on the equilibrium quantities, for type o'" with probability 1 — f nothing 
changes in comparison to the non-trembling equilibrium. With probability 
e, firm 2 delays its production until t = 2. Then, firm 2 observes no period 
one production, puts all weight on type o'" and plays Cournot with this type. 
Thus, if firm 2 trembles, type o'" has an equilibrium profit of
When defecting from this equilibrium, type o'" produces the equilibrium 
quantity (o'"(3 — p"') — o)/(2(3 — p'")). but at t = 1. If firm 2 does not tremble, 
it plays its equilibrium strategy and profits are the same as in equilibrium. 
In the event of a tremble, after observing type o'", firm 2 puts all weight on 
o'" (assuming a' and o" could not gain by switching to this quantity). Firm 






























































































Firm 1 of type a'" will adhere to the equilibrium if is larger than 7tfr .̂ 
This is the case if a > o'"(3 — p'")/3. Using p'" —> 1. a sufficient condition for 
the existence of type IV equilibria, this simplifies to a'" > |n'". As explained 
for case III, there might be equilibria which are not trembling hand perfect, 
in any case, there are type IV equilibria which are trembling hand perfect.
Theorem  3. The equilibria in Theorem. 1 and 2 are trembling hand perfect.
Why does trembling hand perfection reduce the number of equilibria 
in Daughety and Reinganum (1994)? The Daughety and Reinganum model 
differs from the model in this paper in a number of features: a priori, none of 
the two firms is informed: both firms first have to decide whether or not to 
buy information about an uncertain demand parameter, which is the slope 
of the demand curve, and not. as in Mailath (1993) and in this paper, the 
demand intercept. But this difference alone does not lead to differences in 
results. Given the decision to buy this information, they play a timing game 
equivalent to the extended game with action commitment. In particular, in 
the case in which one firm decides to buy information while the other decides 
not to, their analysis is equivalent to the one in this paper.
Daughety and Reinganum introduce only two types, so the first mover 
disadvantage does not exist. This simplifies the timing decision of the in­
formed firm. Further, they introduce two severe parameter restrictions. 
First, they restrict the differences between the two types in such a way that 




























































































information quantities are separating. Second, the uninformed firm's prior 
beliefs about the two types are assumed to lie equal, i.e. both states of de­
mand have a prior probability of 0.5. These restrictions are by no means 
without loss of generality.
Due to these assumptions and simplifications, Daughety and Rein- 
ganum do not obtain equilibria similar to those of type III and type IV 
in the notation of Section 3. Dropping these assumptions, one can show that 
there are more equilibria. In these equilibria the uninformed firm moves first, 
while one type of the informed firm moves first and the other moves second. 
Since there are two types of the informed firm there exist two equilibria. 
Furthermore, it is also clue to the parameter restrictions that Daughety and 
Reinganum manage to erase the non-signalling Stackelberg equilibrium. In 
their model, one type has a profitable defection. As shown above, this is not 
the case in the more general model of this paper.
5 Endogenous Tim ing w ith Observable Delay
In the extended game with observable delay firm Ts timing decision is an 
information set for firm 2. To begin with, beliefs are assumed to be such that 
if firm 1 chooses t — 1. firm 2 carries forward its prior beliefs; and if firm 1 
announces t = 2. then firm 2 puts all weight on a1'. Later in this section, this 
assumption is relaxed and the impact that other beliefs have on equilibrium 
behaviour is analysed.




























































































to its priors. Firm 1 of type a lias an output of qi = (3« — o)/6. These output 





If the sequential move equilibrium, with firm 1 as the Stackelberg leader, 
results from the timing decisions, firm l's output is a second information set 
for firm 2. The attention is restricted to the separating equilibrium as derived 
in the Appendix. The signalling Stackelberg equilibrium profits are. for the 
high state of demand.
(«*)*
~  8 ’ 
^  =
2 1C ‘
for the medium state of demand:
<  * 1 <
( f l m ) 2
8
>  JT.™ >
( o m ) 2
1 G
and for the low state of demand:
( a 1 ) 2
<  7r;
8
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profit be n2F = ~2Ph + x™p"‘ + ?t2P1 • Note that the medium and the low 
demand type of firm 1 have to produce less output and receive lower profits 
than in a model with complete information. Strikingly, this distortion can 
lead to a first-mover disadvantage for the low demand type: the informed 
Stackelberg leader earns a lower profit, and the uninformed Stackelberg fol­
lower earns a higher profit, than in a Cournot equilibrium with complete 
information (Gal-Or (1987)). For some parameters, the profit of the Stack­
elberg follower is even higher than the profit of a Stackelberg leader with 
complete information.
The Cournot equilibrium at t =  2 requires firm 2 to have all weight on 
ah and so firm 2 produces q-2 = o*/3. Firm 1 of type a chooses an output of 
qi = (3a — a")/6. These quantities give equilibrium profits of




In the equilibrium with the uninformed firm 2 as the Stackelberg leader, 
firm 2 produces q2 = ah/ 2. while firm 1 of type a chooses qt = (2a — ah)/4. 
Equilibrium profits are thus
T T j = F*
7t2 =

































































































marized in Figure 1. In the upper right cell of the matrix (the Stackelberg 
signalling equilibrium) the profits depend on beliefs and types. They have 
to be obtained from (29)—(34).
Firm 2









Move second . 9 (3 n - a h V
_____ in_______________ 3(i_______________
Figure 1: The payoff matrix for the timing game with observable delay.
Now take firm l's timing decision. If firm 2 moves first, then firm 1 has 
to choose between playing Cournot at t = 1 and being Stackelberg follower. 
From (27) and (37):
V 6 ) > \  4 j
a < | o \  (39)
which holds for all types and any prior beliefs held bv firm 2. Thus firm 1 
chooses t. = 1 if firm 2 moves first.
If firm 2 moves second, the comparison is between the separating Stack­
elberg leader profit (as in (29), (31) and (33)) and the profit of the Cournot 




























































































preference for t = 1 is
h \2U n
8
> 3a1' -  ah '  2
a o"
Vs, > T (4 0 )
so the high demand type prefers to be Stackelberg leader. For the medium 
demand type, take the lowest possible profit from (31). 7r"' - (fl’")2/9. For 
this to be higher than the Cournot profit at t — 2,
must hold. Using o'" =  | ah (which is required to get the lower bound in (31) 
(see the Appendix)), inequality (41) becomes
,ha
T  > 6 (42)
and so Stackelberg leadership is preferred by the medium demand type also. 




For the lower bound to hold, it must lie that a1 — ybc//' (see the Appendix). 
Plugging this into (43)
± a h ürd ' 
10u  10 (44)
v/ÎÏÏ '  6
results and firm 1 chooses t = 1 for low demand. Thus, for all types of firm 




























































































i.e. the optimal choice is t = 1. Finn 1 has a dominant strategy to move 
first.
Now consider firm 2’s timing decision. Given firm I s dominant strat­
egy, firm 2 has to choose between the Cournot equilibrium at t = 1 and 
playing Stackelberg follower at t = 2. Whether or not it is more profitable 
to announce f =  1 or t = 2 depends on firm 2's priors as well as on the exis­
tence of the first mover disadvantage. Firm 2 will play t = 1 if its expected 
profit from playing Cournot is larger than the expected profit as a Stackel­
berg follower, i.e. if 7t2/ > (ft)2/9. Firm 2 will choose t = 2 if the inequality 
is reversed. So. a first result is that, depending on whether n-2F > (ft)2/ 9 
and given beliefs as specified, the Cournot equilibrium or the Stackelberg 
signalling equilibrium emerge.
Next, check whether beliefs different from those specified above lead to 
further equilibria. Denote the mean beliefs following t — 1 announcement 
by o and the mean beliefs following t = 2 announcement by a. Assume that 
firm 2 plays t = 1. Firm 1 prefers moving first if playing Cournot at t = 1 
(with firm 2 holding beliefs of a) is more profitable than playing Stackelberg 
follower (with firm 2 holding beliefs of ft), that is if




























































































inequality is independent of the type of firm 1 a. so there are no equilibria 
in which different types of firm 1 announce different periods of production. 
Since all types choose the same period, it must be that either a or a is equal 
to prior beliefs a. Above, it was assumed that a = a and a = ah. Clearly, 
a < | ah, i.e. (46) holds and firm 1 chooses t = 1 as derived. However, if 
a > |d  firm 2 playing Stackelberg leader and firm 1 follower is an equilibrium. 
If, for example, a = ah and a = a and if. in addition, ah > |f/. then the non­
signalling Stackelberg equilibrium is the equilibrium of the extended game 
with observable delay.
One possible timing equilibrium remains: the Cournot equilibrium at 
t =  2. It is easy to see that this is not an equilibrium. Firm 2 holds the same 
posteriors when firm 1 plays t = 2. whether as a Stackelberg leader or in the 
Cournot equilibrium. But. in this case firm 2 does strictly better by being 
Stackelberg leader than by playing Cournot. Thus, both firms playing t = 2 
is not an equilibrium.
This completes the analysis of the timing game with observable delay.
Theorem  4. In the extended game with observable delay, the Coum.ot game 
at t =  1 is the timing equilibrium if n-ir > if the inequality is reversed, 
the Stackelberg equilibrium, with firm 1 as the Stackelberg leader is the equi­
librium. The Stackelberg equilibrium, with, firm 2 as Stackelberg leader can be 





























































































For a wide range of parameters, both firms choose t = 1 and the 
Cournot equilibrium is the timing equilibrium. In particular, if the signalling 
distortions in the Stackelberg equilibrium are not too strong (e.g. if a'" and 
a1 produce a quantity higher than the perfect information Cournot equi­
librium). the Cournot equilibrium results, independently of firm 2’s priors. 
Even if parameters are such that the incentives for firm 2 to choose t = 2 
are at their maximum (i.e. if n™ = (a™)2/ 9 and nl2 > (a1)2/ 9) prior beliefs of 
ph > 0.13 are sufficient to make firm 2 still choose t =  1. Put another way. 
for the signalling Stackelberg outcome to be an equilibrium under endoge­
nous timing, a sufficient signalling distortion and high weights on the low 
and medium demand types (p1 + pm > 0.87) are required. Also, the timing 
equilibrium with firm 2 as the Stackelberg leader holds for a limited range 
of parameters only. Prior beliefs have to satisfy rj~ < a < |r/,' as a necessary 
condition.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper endogenous timing in a duopoly with a privately-informed firm 
was examined. Due to a greater generality in comparison to previous pa­
pers, unfortunately, the model has multiple equilibria. There are Stackelberg 
equilibria with either the informed or the uninformed firm moving first, and 
equilibria in which the uninformed firm plays Cournot with some types of 
the informed firm and Stackelberg leader with others. The strong result ob­




























































































that there is a unique timing equilibrium with the privately informed firm as 
the Stackelberg leader, cannot be restated in this model.
The paper also explores what happens if firms may first announce in 
which period they wish to produce without committing themselves to a spe­
cific output. Such a timing game reduces the number of equilibria. For a 
wide range of parameters the outcome is the Cournot equilibrium at stage 
one, constituted by all types of the informed firm and the uninformed firm. 
Ironically, this is the only timing outcome which cannot be sustained as an 
equilibrium under the extended game with action commitment (see also Al- 
baek (1992)). The timing game obviously has a big impact on the sequencing 
outcome. Unfortunately, most authors are not explicit about the impact 
that the specification of the extended game has on the sequencing outcome, 
though, a priori, neither of the timing games is preferable to the other. They 
are relevant in different situations (see Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) and 
Spencer and Blander (1992)).
A theoretical parallel to the two timing games can be found in the 
prices-versus-quantities literature. Singh and Yives (1984) analyse a game in 
which firms first simultaneously choose either price or quantity competition 
and afterwards compete contingent on the chosen type of competition. This 
is similar to the extended game with observable delay. Klemperer and Meyer 
(1986) develop a model in which duopolists simultaneously commit to either 
a concrete quantity or a concrete price. Given this choice, the remaining 




























































































the extended game with action commitment.
A ppendix
The Signalling Stackelberg Equilibrium
In this section firm 1 is restricted to producing at t =  1. and firm 2 at t = 2. 
This Stackelberg game, with the informed firm as the Stackelberg leader and 
the uninformed firm as the follower, constitutes a signalling game: the output 
of firm 1 may signal some information about the state of demand to firm 2. 
The focus is on the separating equilibrium3. In a separating equilibrium firm 
2’s inferences about the state of demand are correct. Consider the output 
choice of each type of firm 1 in turn.
Type ah cannot do better than to produce its full information output 
q\ — a1' / 2 in a separating equilibrium. After observing </{'. firm 2 produces 







Type am has to choose </"' such that type ah does not defect from its
equilibrium quantity q[‘. That is. q\" has to solve the incentive compatibility
3The Separating equilibrium is the only equilibrium which survives the equilibrium 


































































































Solving this expression for q\". one gets two solutions. Only the lower solution 
is incentive compatible: q"‘ = (2ah -  o’" — ((ah -  om)(3o/' -  o’"))1/2/2. It 
is straightforward to see that the full information equilibrium output cannot 
be incentive compatible: q™ =  am/ 2 solves (49) if and only if am = ah/3. 
However, by assumption. am > ah/2. Thus, incentive compatibility requires 
q™ < o’" /2. This establishes an upper bound on q\". A lower bound is 
obtained for am = | a1'. For this value, the full information Cournot output 
q[" =  am/3 solves the incentive compatibility constraint (49). Hence. o’"/3 < 
qi < o"‘/2, which implies o’"/3 > q> > o '"/4. Using the upper and the 
lower bound of the equilibrium quantities, the range of separating equilibrium 
profits for the medium type of demand can be limited to











Incentive compatibility for the low demand type requires 
'2 ar a ' - q [ \  , ...
? i = (52)
Solving (52) explicitly gives an expression which depends on the actual re­
alization of 7r"\ As an upper bound one can again use q\ < a1/ 2. For a 
small 3om — 4a1, q\ < a1/ 3. The lowest possible value of q\ is obtained for 




























































































q[ =  (135 — 9\/9^)«//lG2 «  0.286<v/ and consequently q2 ~  0.357a1. Using 




_ ^  7T2 (
(a1)2 
16 ‘ (54)
The beliefs of firm 2 which support this separating equilibrium are the 
following. If qi > q]". firm 2 puts all weight on ah in its posteriors. If 
q[ < </i < q™, the posteriors have probability one on o’" and. if q\ < q[, 
posterior beliefs are such that the low demand type has probability one. The 
equilibrium quantities, together with the specified beliefs, yield a sequential 
equilibrium.
Existence of Type III and IV Equilibria
For the proof of the existence of type III and type IV equilibria it was required 
above that the types of firm 1 which move first in equilibrium receive a low 
weight in firm 2's priors. In this appendix it is shown that the assumptions 
p' rs 0 and p' + p" « 0  are sufficient, but by no means necessary for the 
existence of type III and IV equilibria respectively.
Start with type III. Figure 2 shows the impact the parameter values 
have on the choice between adhering to and defecting from the equilibria. 































































































In the Section 3. it was shown that, for p' —» 0. Tr?/h — Tif ̂  —> {p"o" + 
p'"a'")/72. The intuition behind this is that firm 2 expects to play Stackelberg 
leader with a" and o'" with a probability of approximately 1. When defecting, 
firm 2 plays Cournot with a" and o'". Thus firm 2’s expected loss from 
defecting is exactly the difference between the Stackelberg leader and the 
Cournot profit played with o" and o'". This determines the intercept on the 
vertical axis in Figure 2. If p' = 1, firm 2 expects to play Cournot with o' at 
t — 1. Defecting to t = 2 does not change profits, given firm I s equilibrium 
behaviour. So. expected gains or losses from defecting are zero if p' — 1. 
This determines — n'j'1 = 0 for p = 1.




























































































When defecting, firm 2 can observe whether type o' moved at t = 1 or 
not. If there has been period 1 production, firm 2 puts all weight on a': 
if not, firm 2 has all weight on a" and o'" such that its mean beliefs are 
(p"a" + p"'a"')/(p" + p'") = a. Now for a small a' — a firm 2’s gain in 
information from defecting is small. The upper concave curve in Figure 2 
represents the extreme case in which o' = a. On the other hand, if o' — a is 
big, firm 2 might gain from defection because the gain in information might 
outweigh the losses from playing Cournot. The lower convex curve results 
from the parameter constellation maximizing firm 2 s incentives to defect: 
a'/2 «  a (according to the restriction a1 > ah/ 2). All other ratios of o' 
and a yield curves which lie between these two extremes, for example, the 
intermediate case, where |o ' = a.
For o' =  a, firm 2 is clearly better off adhering to the equilibrium for 
all values of p'. Simulations show that this is also the case for |o ' < a < |o '. 
Even for the parameter constellation that maximizes the incentives to defect, 
there is a p*, such that, for all p' < p*. firm 2 does not have a profitable 
defection and type III equilibria still exist. Using numerical simulations, one 
can show that p* ss 0.16.
The same argument holds for type IY equilibria and a similar picture 
can be drawn. There is only one difference. In case IV there are two types 
of firm 1 moving first. When defecting, firm 2 can infer the state of demand 
because the different types produce different quantities. So, in contrast to III, 




























































































Jensen's inequality). So. as p' + p" —> 1. the z ‘. fh — ~d̂  curve is non-positive
-  independent of the demand parameters.
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